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SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: OUR FINAL ANSWER?
GERARD V. BRADLEY*
In the 1988 edition of his treatise on The Law of Domestic Rela-
tions, Homer Clark wrote that marriage "is being transformed
from a clearly defined relationship" to one whose "incidents are
either uncertain or left largely to the control of the parties."1
Clark's "incidents" were a large and eclectic lot. They included
basic elements of marriage (that it is, or until recently was, the
principle of sexual morality2), along with secondary attributes
and legal effects (such as the property relations of spouses and
ex-spouses).' Clark opined that the uncertainty and privatization
of marriage emerged suddenly, and "without, so far as it appears,
any general consideration by either courts or legislatures of the
total effect which the judicial decisions will have on the institu-
tion of marriage. ' He wrote ten years, by his count, after a time
when "it would have been inconceivable to deal seriously with the
question of the validity" of same-sex "marriage."5
It is conceivable now. Vermont recently became the first
American jurisdiction to legally recognize same-sex "marriages,"
calling them (chiefly for political reasons) "civil unions." The
Vermont Constitution, as interpreted by the state's highest court
in Baker v. State,6 requires an identity of legal benefits and protec-
tions for all couples-opposite and same-sex-who wish to be
married. The court called for legislative action to implement this
requirement. The decision held out, however, the possibility
that all the incidents of marriage could be extended to same-sex
couples without calling them married. The Vermont legislature,
in other words, had to treat them exactly as it treated married
people. But it could still say, if it wished, that it was not recogniz-
ing same-sex couples as, legally, "married." The legislators chose
this option.7
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School.
1. HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
31 (2d ed. 1988).
2. See id. at 27.
3. See id. at 29.
4. Id. at 31.
5. Id. at 75.
6. 744 A.2d 864 (1999).
7. 1999 Vt. Acts and Resolver 847 (enacted April 26, 2000).
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Some observers say that by calling same-sex relationships
"civil unions," the legislature forestalled the national day of reck-
oning which would be thrust upon us by an express same-sex
marriage law: whether states which do not recognize same-sex
marriages must give "full faith and credit" to marriages from
states that do.
This observation is surely mistaken, the product of naivete in
some, and of disingenuousness in others. For among the most
valuable legal benefits and protections of marriage is interstate
portability. As Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson said in
1948:
If there is one thing that the people are entitled to
expect from their lawmakers, it is rules of law that will
enable individuals to tell whether they are married and, if
so, to whom.... [T]he uncertainties that result are not
merely technical, nor are they trivial; they affect fundamen-
tal rights and relatins such as the lawfulness of their cohab-
itation, their children's legitimacy, their tide to property,
and even whether they are law-abiding persons or
criminals. 8
Jackson wrote, it is true, when it mattered more than it does
today with whom one spends the night. But even now, the differ-
ence between bigamy and lawful marriage can be how well a
divorce decree travels. And the many benefits of marriage pro-
vide enough incentive for Vermont same-sex couples to seek mari-
tal status in states to which they migrate, either temporarily or for
the long haul.
Sometime soon a same-sex couple "uni[ted]" in Vermont
will seek to be treated in some destination state as they are
treated in Vermont. In that vast majority of jurisdictions which
will, for the foreseeable future, maintain one legal status for
couples-opposite-sex marriage-Vermonters will have to be
assimilated to it, or endure discrimination. Upon discrimination
by the first state, our disappointed Vermonters will return to
their state's highest court, accurately alleging an inequality of ben-
efits and protections: Vermonters Joe and Jill are treated as mar-
ried elsewhere, but not plaintiffs Joe and Jack. The Vermont
legislature will then have no choice but to assimilate same-sex
partnerships to the legal status occupied by all other "married"
couples in the Green Mountain state. At that point, the Full
Faith and Credit question will be inevitable.
8. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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All of this may occur before the year is out. It is a near-term
certainty. Have we had yet that "general consideration" of the
effects upon the "institution of marriage," oddly missing when
Clark wrote? What would such a consideration look like? This
article examines those two questions.
I. NEUTRALITY
Many people believe that marriage is a union of a man and a
woman. Many such people are married to persons of the oppo-
site sex, and cannot really imagine the attraction some persons
have for others of the same sex. They would be vastly disap-
pointed if one of their children decided that he or she wanted to
marry someone of the same-sex. They often also say, however,
that it would be wrong, perhaps even a grave injustice, for the
state to base its law of marriage on a controversial moral judge-
ment, including the judgment-in fact, theirs and that of most
people-that marriage is the union of one man and one woman.
The thought is that the state ought to be neutral as between com-
peting understandings of what marriage is. It would be wrong,
these persons say, for the state to impose anyone's moral code for
marriage, to make my, or your, morality the template impressed
upon all.
Sometimes this viewpoint is elaborated along the following
lines. Marriage is, in truth, the union of a man and a woman, as
Scripture teaches. Marriage is a sacrament (or an analogous
sacred relationship) in many religions. But, although it is the
truth about marriage, the religious provenance of this definition
makes it an inappropriate basis for civil law. Along these lines,
one could say that marriage really is permanent and that divorce
is impermissible or even, strictly speaking, impossible. But one
could also coherently say that civil law ought not to track this
view by making no provision for divorce.
About this way of viewing the relationship of the truth about
marriage and the civil law, I make the following three prelimi-
nary points. First, on no one's account of it (as far as I know) is
the civil law supposed to simply reproduce the moral truth about
marriage. Much of what is truly good in and about marriage is
beyond effective legal assistance. The endless self-giving that is
required of spouses could be scarcely legally enforced. Everyone
is a bad spouse sometimes, and some persons are bad spouses
most of the time. Still, no one suggests that there should be legal
penalties for being a bad spouse. Men who see more of profes-
sional football than they do their wife and children will have a lot
to answer for on Judgment Day-in the hereafter, not here.
2000]
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The most that anyone proposes is that the civil law ought to
reflect some basic or defining features of marriage, and only
where that serves political society's common good.9 To what
extent the law ought to make provision for civil divorce is, it
seems to me, a question permitting a range of answers consistent
with the moral truth that a valid marriage is indissoluble. A legal
regime of "no-fault divorce," though, seems outside that range.
But one need not take a strong view of the permanence of mar-
riage to hold that no-fault divorce has worked great harm to
innocent people in our society, and that some type of fault
regime would be a great benefit.10
I propose this interpretation of Griswold. Assume that a
majority of the Court believed there was no right to use contra-
ceptives, even for married couples, because contraception is
intrinsically immoral and that there cannot be a moral right to
do a moral wrong, nor should there be a legal (or constitutional)
right specified by an immoral act. The Griswold decision could
still be written in about the same terms. That is, not only did the
Court expressly decline to find a right to use contraceptives, such
a finding is not necessary to explain its opinion. This interpreta-
tion of Griswold supposes, as the Justices repeatedly indicated,
that there are many goods of marital intimacy (including non-
contraceptive sexual intimacy) which are damaged by exposure
to others. These goods are damaged particularly by involuntary
exposures to public authority. Suppose further, as the Justices
seem to have, that a criminal prohibition upon contraceptive use
affect marital privacy as it should be understood.
Second, the common mindset described above suffers from
what I call the "transparency" problem. When speaking of one's
judgment that, for example, same-sex marriage is wrong or
9. It is important to note here that "common good" should not be under-
stood along the utilitarian lines. The common good of political society includes
a decent concern for public morality and, as we shall see, maintenance of con-
ditions which help people to understand what marriage is and to succeed in the
marriages they enter into.
10. An example of how the truth about marriage fits with the common
good may be Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1968). Griswold did not state
a right to use contraceptives, even within marriage. Justices White and
Goldberg came close to saying as much, but the center of gravity of the case is
something quite distinct. Marital privacy, comprised of the confidentiality
which marital friendship requires for its enjoyment, joined to spatial privacy in
one's home, is at the core of Griswold. The opinion of the Court refers to the
"intimate relation of husband and wife"; "privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship"; and, finally, this understanding of marriage: "a coming together
for better or worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred." Id. at 480-83.
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impossible, one is often heard to say that it is "my" view, or part
of "my moral code." This way of speaking is often an innocent
locution for the proposition, "same-sex marriage is simply wrong,
objectively." This way of speaking is harmful, however, when cas-
ually (often unthinkingly) joined to ambient notions of moral
subtectivism or emotivitism. Then, when one says that coercion
based upon "my" morality would be an unfair imposition, one is
right. For the fact that a judgment is mine is not a reason for the
state to act in a certain way, perhaps especially to the detriment
of others who do not share my view. That one feels repulsed by
what homosexuals do is not a reason for public policy. It is not a
reason at all. It is just a feeling.
But no one really thinks that the fact of holding a view is a
reason for action, apart from the reasons why one holds the view
to be true. Thus, in contrast to the opaque or intransitive quality
of moraljudgment evident in the common view expressed above,
conclusions about the morality of same-sex marriage usually are,
and should generally be seen as, transparent for the reasons why
the view is held. Some people may be able to give no account of
their reasons. They will make uninteresting conversation part-
ners. Some people really are moral emotivists or relativists, and
would be unfairly imposing upon others if they caused the state to
act coercively on the basis of their feelings. But these facts about
some people do not support the proposition that opposition to
same-sex marriage is necessarily, or even commonly, subjective,
or emotivist.
Most people believe and mean to say that same-sex marriage
is simply wrong for everyone, that it is objectively and categori-
cally immoral. This view could be false. If it is, its falsity is suffi-
cient reason to discard it. Then doctrines about political
"neutrality" or unjust imposition are unnecessary. If the view is
true, then such doctrines are either inapposite, or require argu-
ment in their favor.
Third, the common mindset asserts or implies that certain
truths about marriage (such as its permanence or heterosexual-
ity) can be known only due to revelation or because of the author-
ity of a sacred text or religious personality. The view asserts or
implies that they are not knowable by reason alone. Some
defenses of legal recognition of same-sex marriage, notably the
Hawaii Supreme Court decision examined below, appear to take
this view. If this account is true, I agree that the civil law should
not be founded upon such esoteric truths. But the Hawaii court
baldly asserted the non-rational, and (evidently) the sectarian,
province of the heterosexuality of marriage. Assertions will not
do; nor will simple dismissals.
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Now, note well: the claim that the law ought to be morally
neutral about marriage, or anything else for that matter, is itself a
moral claim. It-the claim that the law ought to be neutral-is
not morally neutral. As Professor Robert George points out, any-
one who holds that the civil provisions governing marriage (or
any other institution or practice) ought to be morally neutral
does not assert, nor does the position presuppose, that the law
ought to be neutral as between the view that the law ought to be
neutral and competing moral views.11 It is "obvious," he says,
"that neutrality between neutrality and non-neutrality is logically
impossible."1 2
That a deep moral neutrality, between the view that the law
ought to prescind from the truth of the matter about marriage,
and the view that the law should not prescind, is logically impos-
sible, does not mean that all possible types of neutrality must be
rejected. It simply means that the correctness of the view in favor
of a practical neutrality must be argued for. And sophisticated
proponents of moral neutrality do argue that the best under-
standing of political morality for our society requires that the law
be morally neutral with respect to marriage. They argue that
"alternative understandings of political morality, insofar as they
fail to recognize the principle of moral neutrality, are, they say,
mistaken and ought, as such, to be rejected.' 13
What might this (revised) argument in favor of neutrality
say? Stephen Macedo has made probably the best (revised) argu-
ment for moral neutrality.' 4 He defends the proposition that
even if the inherited definition of marriage as a union of one
man and one woman is true, the state cannot justly recognize it
as such. For if disagreements about the nature of marriage "lie
in . .. difficult philosophical quarrels, about which reasonable
people have long disagreed, then our differences lie in precisely
the territory that John Rawls rightly marks off as inappropriate to
the fashioning of our basic rights and liberties."' 5 And from this
it follows that government must remain neutral as between con-
ceptions of marriage as intrinsically heterosexual (and monoga-
mous), and conceptions according to which "marriages" may be
contracted not only between a man and a woman, but also
between two men, two women (and, presumably, a man or a
11. See Robert P. George, "Same-sex Marriage" and "Moral Neutrality"
(unpublished paper on file with author). Much of the next few paragraphs
follows Professor George's argument.
12. Id. at 23.
13. Id.
14. Stephen Macedo, Reply to Critics, 84 GEO. L.J. 329 (1995).
15. Id. at 335.
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woman and multiple male and/or female "spouses"). Otherwise,
according to Macedo, the state would "inappropriately" be
"deny[ing] people fundamental aspects of equality based on rea-
sons and arguments whose force can only be appreciated by
those who accept difficult to assess (metaphysical and moral]
claims."' 6
There is good reason to hold, however, that the meaning
and significance of marriage are available, in any effective and
widespread way, only where the host culture, including its law,
embodies and encourages a sound understanding of marriage.
As Professor George states:
[Where] ideologies and practices which are hostile to a
sound understanding and practice of marriage in a culture
tend to undermine the institution of marriage in that cul-
ture, thus making it difficult for large numbers of people
to grasp the true meaning, value, and significance of mar-
riage, it is extremely important that government eschew
attempts to be "neutral" with regard to competing concep-
tions of marriage and try hard to embody in its law and
policy the soundest, most nearly correct conception.'
7
The positive law, even in societies like ours in which people
often profess "neutrality," is still a potent teacher. The law will
inevitably teach some lesson about what marriage is, and what par-
ties to marriage can or should expect from it. It may seem that
the law is innocent of such aspirations, and bereft of such presup-
positions. It may seem that marriage, viewed legally, is all form
without substance. It may seem that the law teaches only the les-
son articulated by Homer Clark: marriage is tailor-made to suit
the parties to it, and that the function and purpose of marriage
law is to facilitate the choices of the individuals who are getting
married. It may seem that Justice Brennan captured our notions
when he stated:
Even if we can agree, therefore, that "family" and
"parenthood" are part of the good life, it is absurd to
assume that we can agree on the content of those terms
and destructive to pretend that we do. In a community
such as ours, "liberty" must include the freedom not to
conform. 18
All these expressions suggest that the state can, and should,
recognize and endorse marriage-if only by bestowing some
16. Id.
17. George, supra note 11, at 23.
18. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989).
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three hundred or so incidental benefits-without any specific
definition of the relationship, and evidently without using evalua-
tive criteria.
It is impossible to imagine an institution, however, with as
many legal benefits as marriage, having (or proponents of the
institution and its concomitant benefits, having) no self-under-
standing, no parameters, no extra-legal presuppositions or com-
mitments. It would be bizarre, and very likely unjust, to impose
the costs of such benefits and protections upon society's mem-
bers without an answer to the question, Why? How is the cost
justified? What is marriage, and why is it so special? No answer is
possible without some definition of marriage, and without some
theory of that relationship to its parties, and to political society.
We find, unsurprisingly then, that legal stories about mar-
riage always contain some specification of marriage's value.
Homer Clark said: "the fact is that the most significant function
of marriage today seems to be that it furnishes emotional satisfac-
tions to be found in no other relationships. For many people it is
a refuge from the coldness and impersonality of contemporary
existence."19 Maybe so. But upon what basis is this particular
property of marriage picked out from among all its properties,
held up as especially salient to deliberation by public authority,
and deemed sufficient to justify the regime of special treatment
we accord marriage? Mark Strasser, in Legally Wed: Same-sex Mar-
riage and the Constitution, argues that the state has "a responsibility
to recognize" the "intensely personal bonds" between committed
homosexuals.2 ° Again, why should "intensely personal bonds" be
the sine qua non of marriage, and upon what basis does the state
have a "responsibility" to endorse them? Why not the "intensely
personal bonds" between siblings? Close, but not sexually
involved, friends?
Joseph Raz, who does not take the negative view of same-sex
marriage that I do, nevertheless correctly states the relation
between marriage the law of and the real-world possibilities for
participation in the good of marriage: "[M]onogamy, assuming
that it is the only valuable form of marriage, cannot be practised
by an individual. It requires a culture which recognizes it, and
which supports it through the public's attitude and through its
formal institutions."'" Raz does not suppose that, in a culture
whose law and public morality do not support monogamy, some-
one who happens to believe in it somehow will be unable to
19. Clark, supra note 1, at 28.
20. Mark Strasser, Legally Wed: Same-sex Marriage and the Constitution, at
21. JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITv OF FREEDOM 162 (1986).
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restrict himself to having one wife or will be required to take
additional wives.2 2 His point, rather, is:
[E]ven if monogamy is a key element of a sound under-
standing of marriage, large numbers of people will fail to
understand that or why that is the case-and will therefore
fail to grasp the value of monogamy and the intelligible
point of practicing it-unless they are assisted by a culture
which supports, monogamous marriage. Marriage is the
type of good which can be participated in, or fully partici-
pated in, only by people who properly understand it and
choose it with a proper understanding in mind; yet peo-
ple's ability properly to understand it, and thus to choose
it, depends upon institutions and cultural understandings
that transcend individual choice.
23
II. EQUALITY
Some arguments for legal recognition of same-sex marriage,
though phrased in terms of equality, actually depend upon the
validity of (presupposed) neutrality claims. Stephen Macedo
says that the law of marriage denies "fundamental aspects of
equality" by embodying the moral judgment that marriage is
inherently heterosexual. 24 But this is sound only if it is false that
marriage is inherently heterosexual. If that view is false, the rea-
son for recognizing same-sex marriages is that such unions are as
a matter of moral fact indistinguishable from marriages of the
traditional type. If the moral judgment is true, then Macedo's
claim that the recognition of this truth by government "denies
fundamental aspects of equality" is simply mistaken.25
In Bowers v. Hardwick26 Justice Harry Blackmun suggested a
intriguing argument, based in equality, for legal recognition of
same-sex marriage. The context in Bowers, of course, was not
same-sex marriage but homosexual sexual acts. Blackmun's
notion of equal respect for the foundation of a person's identity
and essential acts in conformity therewith nevertheless seems-if
sound-potent enough to carry the case for recognition of same-
sex marriage.
The Court resolved in Bowers that Georgia could, consistent
with the Constitution, make the sodomitical acts of homosexuals
a crime. In the course of his dissent from that holding, Justice
22. See George, supra note 11, at 24.
23. RAZ, supra note 21, at 162.
24. Macedo, supra note 14, at 335.
25. See George, supra note 11, at 23.
26. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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Blackmun referred to "homosexual orientation" as "the very
fiber of an individual's personality," a fiber not "simply a matter
of deliberate personal election. 27 In other words, at least some
homosexuals find themselves inescapably, but fundamentally,
attracted to persons of the same sex. And if marriage is consid-
ered the setting in which sexual acts are appropriate, then (as
Blackmun said in Bowers) the homosexual "is given no real
choice but a life without physical intimacy."28 This, Blackmun
left to inevitable inference, was both cruel and unequal, more
than anyone should be asked to bear, more than heterosexuals
are asked to bear.
Blackmun seems to be assuming that everyone is entitled to
regular (albeit "harmless") satisfaction of the sexual urge. On all
these assumptions, then, there is a denial of some sort of "equal-
ity" where, at least as far as formal legal treatment is concerned,
the state recognizes no legitimate sexual outlet for homosexuals.
Blackmun's argument is question-begging. He deployed an
equivocal notion of "identity" to sustain his argument that equal
respect for "identity" somehow requires a legally recognized form
of sexual expression for persons who are homosexual. Here
"gay" as an "identity" has two very different meanings. Its "invol-
untary condition" connotation evokes moral blamelessness, and
generates support for approving attitude towards homosexuals.
But its "lifestyle choices" connotation-that is, the choice to per-
form same-sex sexual acts-then slips into view as the subject of
support. In other words, one is invited to approve "identity" in
the former sense, and then is told one has, or must have
approved "identity" in the latter sense.
This bait and switch will not do. Persons do constitute their
identities. But they do not do so by identifying some sub-rational
drive (like "sexual orientation"), but through free choices. Some
homosexuals may not choose to be homosexual. But they can
and do choose to be "gay" or "lesbian"; that is, they choose to
identify themselves as not only persons with a same-sex attraction
but as "gay": homosexual and approving of same-sex sexual
activity.
Blackmun's argument fails for another reason, too. To
expect others to "respect" or in any way endorse someone as
"gay" is to require them to give sodomy a positive moral value.
This expectation, often expressed as a demand, indicates a lack
of respect for all others who regard sodomy as immoral. Thus
"homophobia" is treated as racism deserves to be treated.
27. Id. at 202-03 n.2 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
28. Id.
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In truth nothing in opposition to legal recognition of same-
sex marriage intends or implies insult to homosexuals or a denial
of equality of respect and concern towards them. The equality of
all persons is an equality of dignity, which means that each one's
good is as good as everyone else's. And one shows respect and
concern for homosexuals precisely by declining to accord sod-
omy a moral value it simply does not possess.
Was not the holding in Bowers, in any event, based upon an
animus towards homosexuals? Did not the Court there narrow a
statute which outlawed sodomy, without limitation to homosexu-
als or all unmarried persons, to homosexual sexual acts? Yes.
The Supreme Court narrowed the statute so that it applied to the
homosexual liaison of Michael Hardwick. Though it was not a
holding of the Court, the Bowers majority limited its ruling to the
latter question-to the question of homosexual sodomy-even
though the relevant Georgia statute did not expressly distinguish
sodomy within marriage from sodomy without. Whether this
narrow reading wasjustified, I do not know. But, for reasons sim-
ilar to those advanced in support of my interpretation of Gris-
wold,2" one could favor legally treating homosexual sodomy
different from sodomy between persons who are married. One
could hold that oral and anal intercourse are objectively wrong
for everyone, married or unmarried, heterosexual or homosex-
ual. And one could coherently hold that sodomy within marriage
should be put beyond legal interference (and in that sense, "pri-
vate"), but that sodomy outside of marriage should be subject to
legal restraint. Is there a good reason to treat sodomy between
unmarried homosexuals worse than sodomy between unmarried
heterosexuals? I think not. The ground of different treatment
within marriage is the moral value and legal fragility of marriage.
Where marriage and its requirements are no longer in view, the
simple immorality of all sodomitical acts, seems to call for identi-
cal legal treatments.
III. ARBITRARINESS
Another type of equality argument has much appeal, and it
is time to examine it. The examination is especially important
because the structure of this argument, though not all its mate-
rial content, persuaded the high courts of Vermont and Hawaii
to (all but in name) recognize same-sex marriage.
The argument, in outline form, is this. What most hetero-
sexual couples seek and obtain from marriage-and thus what
29. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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they consider marriage to be-depends in no significant way
upon their heterosexuality; same-sex couples can and do obtain
the same things from their committed relationships. Many same-
sex couples consider their relationships to be marital, and desire
legal recognition of their relationships as marriage. This desire
includes but is not limited to the attraction and utility of tangible
benefits legally available to married couples. Like most opposite-
sex couples, same-sex couples find the state's recognition an
endorsement of sorts, a welcome perfection of, or intangible sup-
plement to, their unions. The conclusion: it is arbitrary to deny
recognition to same-sex relationships. Lacking as it does a rea-
sonable basis, denial of recognition probably rests upon some
irrational prejudice towards homosexuals. Either way-as arbi-
trary or as hateful-exclusion of same-sex couples from the legal
regime inhabited by opposite-sex couples is unconstitutional.
There is much to be said in favor of this argument. After all,
this far down the road of "transformation" charted by Homer
Clark, what do many (most?) men and women assent to when
they say "I do." Many (most?) mean to set up and manage a
household, more or less throwing their financial lots together.
They agree to try hard at an emotionally intimate, sexually-active
relationship, hopefully lasting and, ideally, sexually exclusive.
Children? Maybe, eventually. But for now, sodomitical acts and
acts of contracepted intercourse make for a mutually agreeable,
pleasurable sex life.
Homer Clark is once again a reliable witness:
It seems to be that contemporary marriage cannot be
legally defined any more precisely than as some sort of
relationship between two individuals, of indeterminate
duration, involving some kind of sexual conduct, entailing
vague mutual property and support obligations, a relation-
ship which may be formed by consent of both parties and
dissolved at the will of either.30
On this common view, men and women entering marriage
intend principally personal benefits to themselves: sexual satisfac-
tion, emotional intimacy and support, mutual sharing of house-
hold duties, and (perhaps) children. But same-sex couples can
and do obtain these same benefits. They can even have children,
though not of their own union. They can adopt, sometimes the
natural children of one partner from a marriage which went bad
after the partner discovered his or her homosexuality. Or, if the
couple is male, they can contract with a woman friend or
acquaintance or stranger to bear the child of one of them. If the
30. Clark, supra note 1, at 28.
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couple is female, one can impregnate herself, either through the
services of a sperm bank or of a more intimate donor.
This argument is that it is not coherent with marriage as it is
really practiced by the American people for the people-and their
representatives exercising public authority-to say that commit-
ted homosexual relationships are not, and cannot be, marriages.
One obvious counter-argument is that opposite-sex couples can
express or actualize something in their sexual acts which same-
sex couples do not: marriage. Since same-sex couples cannot
marry they cannot be doing the same thing that married couples
do, insofar as married couples experience in their marital acts, in
addition to pleasure and emotional benefits, the intelligible
good of their marriage itself. It simply is the case, the counter-
argument holds, that same-sex couples cannot, and never will be
able to, engage in the reproductive type acts-sexual inter-
course, open to the gift of new life-that married couples can
perform.
This counter-argument is question-begging. Why cannot
same-sex couples marry, where marriage is not, as it seems not to
be in our legal culture, tied to openness to children? After all,
sterile couples are permitted to marry, and many fertile couples
with no present interest in having children get married too.
A full response to this challenge requires careful elaboration
of precisely how marriage is a reproductive communion of per-
sons, a two-in-one flesh lifetime friendship which, as such, is avail-
able only to persons of the opposite sex. That elaboration is to
be found in Part VI of this article. In advance of that full discus-
sion, however, we can see that this argument from coherence is
not as persuasive as it first appears. Indeed, it is unsuccessful.
There is nothing unbecoming in arguments, like the one
just sketched, which identify an apparent arbitrariness in
"straight" monopolization of marriage. But the picture just
presented is only part of the story. Additional pertinent facts
include that, at least for male homosexuals, "committed" rela-
tionships are very rarely lasting, and almost never sexually exclu-
sive. There is abundant evidence that neither permanence nor
sexual exclusivity are considered norms even by those (perhaps
relatively few) male homosexuals who are in a committed rela-
tionship. There appears to be very little support, at least among
male homosexuals, for monogamy even as a norm, as heterosexu-
als and our law understand it.
It is true, as the incoherence argument form same-sex mar-
riage alleges, that many married couples today are ambivalent
about having children. Many married couples today do, in fact,
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engage in completed sexual acts other than intercourse. But
even these couples recognize the difference, not just in the physi-
cal performance, but in the way in which their marriage is exper-
ienced between sodomy and sexual intercourse, especially where
the couple do nothing to impede whatever procreative possibili-
ties inhere in that act of intercourse. Simply put, marital acts in
which the couple places hopes of having a baby are experienced
by that couple as different, especially fulfilling acts, just from the
point of view of allowing them to experience their marriage.
Moreover, sterility is not considered a blessing upon a
couple's marriage. To a greater or lesser degree, it is exper-
ienced by the vast majority of sterile couples as a loss, as a depri-
vation. Children do not "complete" a marriage in the sense that
a marriage is not official or valid until children are born. (Other-
wise, everyone of us who is a firstborn would have been con-
ceived out of wedlock.) Childless couples are really married. But
compared to a sterile couple who have adopted children, the
couple which conceives and brings forth children from its own
marital acts perfects their marriage in an unsurpassable way.
The massive discordant fact simply is this: most Americans do
not believe that people can marry a person of the same sex. That
means that most Americans think that gender complementarity
is, somehow, essential to marriage. If that does not indicate a
popular conviction at odds with the arbitrariness argument, I
cannot imagine what would.
The practical predicate to the incoherence argument is
faulty. There is also a logical flaw in the argument; people do
not accept all that is entailed by their premises. Few are aware of
where their premises lead, and many do not know much of what
is entailed. Now is their opportunity to see what premises are
necessary to defend what they still hold to be true-that mar-
riage is the more or less permanent and exclusive union of one
man and one woman, and that this relationship is the principle
of all sexual morality. Once the two coherent accounts of sexual
morality are fully sketched-and only then-can the American
people actually decide whether they wish to conform their prac-
tices to the true nature of marriage, or to release the law's under-
standing of marriage from its foundation in gender
complementarity.
IV. COURTS
The argument from popular or cultural arbitrariness is over-
drawn. A structurally similar argument nevertheless persuaded
the Vermont Supreme Court that discrimination against same-
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sex couples was inconsistent with that state constitution's "com-
mon benefits" clause. The argument advanced by the court
aimed to show that Vermont maintains no coherent legal view of
marriage which same-sex couples from its benefits. The rejoin-
der is also similar to that proposed against the cultural argument
from inequality: the law of marriage may, up to a significant
point, be incoherent. But this fact of incoherence makes the
question of what the law of marriage should be all the more acute.
It does not settle, by force of logic, what the law is. We can see in
the Vermont court's opinion the effects of Clark's observations:
the law of marriage stands at a dangerously high precipice,
pushed there by proponents of same-sex marriage. Now is the
time for that consideration, already overdue when Clark wrote in
1988.
The Vermont court held that all legal benefits must be uni-
formly distributed, save where the exclusion of some persons
"bears a reasonable and just relation to the governmental pur-
pose" of the benefit program.3' The court observed that "the
benefits and protections incident to a marriage license under
Vermont law have never been greater,"3 2 and that therefore that
"any statutory exclusion must necessarily be grounded on public
concerns of sufficient weight, cogency, and authority that the jus-
tice of the deprivation cannot seriously be questioned."3 Notice
the starting point: equality concerns dictate that everyone, at
least presumptively, is eligible to recieve the benefits of marriage.
It looks, then, like the benefits are primafacie constitutive of the
class of beneficiaries: anyone who would be (or thinks he would
be) better off with the benefits is presumptively entitled to get
married.
The state was on the right track in its justification for limit-
ing marital benefits to opposite sex couples. Its interest was the
link between marriage, procreation, and child rearing. In proba-
bly the court's most sympathetic statement of this interest, the
stated aim was to promote a "permanent commitment between
couples who have children to ensure that their offspring are con-
sidered legitimate," receive "ongoing parental support 4", and
that there be a sustained public message that child rearing is
"intertwined" with the procreative acts of man and woman mar-
ried to each other.
31. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 879 (1999).
32. Id. at 883
33. Id. at 884
34. Id. at 881
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The court responded along the lines of the arbitrariness
argument. "It is equally undisputed that many opposite-sex
couples marry for reasons unrelated to procreation, that some of
these couples never intend to have children, and that others are
incapable of having children.35 If the purpose of the statutory
exclusion of same-sex couples is to "further[ ] the link between
procreation and child rearing," it is significantly under-inclu-
sive.36 The law extends the benefits and protections of marriage
to many persons with no logical connection to the stated govern-
mental goal. 7 Therefore, "the statutes plainly exclude many
same-sex couples who are no different from opposite-sex couples
with respect to these objective."38
The state also argued that "because same-sex couples cannot
conceive a child on their own, their exclusion promotes a "per-
ception of the link between procreation and child rearing." The
court responded: "Indeed, it is undisputed that most of those
who utilize nontraditional means of conception are infertile mar-
ried couples."3 Hence the law's acceptance of certain reproduc-
tive technologies making conception independent (in some way)
of marital intercourse, undermined the case against same-sex
marriage. But as the last quoted sentence suggests, the non-pro-
hibition of such acts as artificial insemination probably owes
much to a desire by those responsible for the law to extend the
reproductive meaning of marriage to couples unable to generate
children from their own acts of intercourse, not, as the court
seems to have concluded, to obliterate the (central) reproductive
meaning of marriage.
The state's remaining claims were undone by another con-
cession, this time to same-sex couples themselves. "The Legisla-
ture could conclude," wrote the court, "that opposite-sex
partners offer advantages" in the area of "childrearing." After
noting "that child-development experts disagree and the answer
is decidedly uncertain," the court moved on to the "fundamental
flaw": the "legislature's endorsement of a policy diametrically at
odds with the State's claim." That policy was the removal, in
1996, of all legal barriers to the adoption of children by same-sex
couples.40
Taken as a straightforward proposition, that same-sex
couples may adopt, implies that the particular two people are
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 881.
38. Id. at 882.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 884 (for all quotations in paragraph).
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acceptable parents. It does not imply that they can marry. Many
single persons adopt children, and that implies nothing about
marriage. That same-sex couples may adopt, moreover, implies
nothing positive or favorable about their sexual identity and activi-
ties. Two persons of the same sex, though not a sexually involved
"couple," could probably serve as adoptive parents, too. This is
very likely the description under which "same-sex couples" are
permitted to adopt, in Vermont, and elsewhere. It is doubtful, in
other words, that Vermont accepted adoption by sexually
involved same-sex couples because of their sexual relationship.
One simply cannot deduce from the fact that same-sex couples
may adopt that as gay they are thought to be fit parents, or that
they can marry their same-sex partner.
Finally, but most important, if accepting adoption by same-
sex couples entailed same-sex marriage, those who accepted same-
sex couples adoption very likely did not think so. Now they
should be given the opportunity to decide whether, if that is what
is entailed, they wish to retract the permission to adopt. Instead
the Vermont Supreme Court made sure that the issue of same-
sex marriage was never really decided: there is no alternative
now,-because of decisions then,-to recognition of same-sex
marriage. But, there is no evidence, and certainly none was
adduced by the Vermont court, that then anyone was expressing
any view, much less a favorable one, about same-sex marriage.
A continent away, and a few years before Baker, the Hawaii
Supreme Court engaged in another evasive validation of same-
sex marriage. What did the Hawaii Supreme Court, in the case
of Ninia Baehr (who wanted to marry Genora Dancel) versus
John Lewin (the state official responsible for denying Baehr a
marriage license), say?41 Probably not what you think it did.
One would expect from all that was reported about this decision
that Hawaiian same-sex marriage is "gay marriage," with its
implicit approval of homosexual sexual activity. Hawaiian same-
sex marriage turns out to be no-sex marriage. "'Homosexual'
and 'same-sex' marriages are not synonymous; by the same
token, a 'heterosexual' same-sex marriage is, in theory, not
oxymoronic.... Parties to 'a union between a man and a woman'
may or may not be homosexuals. Parties to a same-sex marriage
could be either homosexuals or heterosexuals."42 The court
later said that "it is immaterial" whether "the plaintiffs [that is,
the same-sex couples, including Baehr and Doncel] are homo-
41. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (1993).
42. Id. at 51 n.1l.
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sexuals."4 3 The court also pointed out that nowhere did the
plaintiffs say they were homosexual (or, heterosexual, for that
matter) 44
The Hawaii Supreme Court discussed at length what most
people have in mind when they speak of marriage. But this mar-
riage the court associated with the right of privacy located some-
where in the federal constitution, and called it the "federal
construct" of marriage. It, the court correctly reported, "pres-
ently contemplates unions between men and women," and is
associated with or defined by the "fundamental rights of procrea-
tion, childbirth, abortion, and child rearing."4 5 (Yes, the court
did say that "abortion" is part of the definition of marriage, a
proposition which would surprise most people. And, what the
court meant by its assertion of this heterogeneous bundle and
the "federal" right to marry as "the logical predicate[s]" of each
other is anyone's guess.)
We can see that Hawaiian marriage swings free of the "fed-
eral construct," and of the idea that one essential feature of mar-
riage is that it is a sexual, indeed reproductive, union. Let's call
this, simply, marriage. Hawaiian "marriage" is radically divorced
from it. The estrangement is most vividly illustrated in the
court's response to arguments advanced on behalf of Miike. The
state, as the court related the point, "contends that 'the fact that
homosexual [sic-actually, same-sex] partners cannot form a
state-licensed marriage is not the product of impermissible dis-
crimination' implicating equal protection considerations, but
rather 'a function of their biologic inability as a couple to satisfy
the definition of the status to which they aspire."' 4 6 The argu-
ment is, in other words, that given what marriage really-meta-
physically, morally, pre-legally-is, persons of the same gender
cannot marry. "We believe," said the court, that the argument is
"circular and unpersuasive," "an exercise in tortured and con-
clusory sophistry."4 7
The court's "behal[f]" amounted to a simple declaration
that it would not hear, in a case raising the legal recognition of
same-sex marriages, arguments about what marriage is. And so
the Hawaii Supreme Court articulated and imposed upon the
people of that state an unsurpassably positivistic definition of
marriage, one which could be related to the moral reality of the
43. Id. at 53 n.14.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 60.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 61.
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matter by, evidently, only a sadistic sophist. The court's marriage
was, in principle, sexless, and almost all about money. Calling it
revealingly at one point a "legal partnership," the court listed
fourteen specific benefits to which this "legally conferred status"
is the gatekeeper. Twelve of them were clearly economic advan-
tages; the other two-easier name changing and the evidentiary
privilege for spousal communication-were relatively minor.
V. GETTING THE QUESTION RIGHT
The Hawaii court got the fundamental question backwards.
One should not imagine-as the court did-that the law attaches
certain benefits to the status of "marriage" without first determin-
ing that there is a specific relationship which deserves such benefi-
cial treatment. One should not imagine that lawmakers ever
decided to create an entitlement program and called it (for some
reason) "marriage," with the idea of making eligibility (to be
"married") functionally related to the benefits: If you can enjoy
the benefits, you can get married. On this view, "marriage" is an
empty placeholder in a social welfare scheme.
There is no room to doubt that the legal regime-of bene-
fits, protections and duties-which has surrounded marriage
since our founding got it precisely the other way around. Mar-
riage has regularly been said to be subject to legal regulation.
But the central thrust of the many political, especially judicial,
testimonies to the value of marriage has been the salutary effects
this pre-political (and thus natural) institution has upon the for-
tunes of political society, and upon the happiness of people. For
these reasons marriage has been thought worthy of extensive
social and legal support.
Two examples of judicial testimony will have to suffice. In
Maynard v. Hill,"8 the U.S. Supreme Court said that marriage cre-
ates "the most important relation in life" and has "more to do
with the morals and civilization of a people than any other insti-
tution."49 Marriage also, the Court said, "is the foundation of the
family and of society, without which there would be neither civili-
zation of progress."" °
Why? In 1961, Justice Harlan explained, though in a sum-
mary way, why marriage-the union of one man and one
woman-occupies this central vote:
IT]he very inclusion of the category of morality among
state concerns indicates that society is not limited in its
48. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
49. Id. at 211.
50. Id.
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objects only to the physical well-being of the community,
but has traditionally concerned it self with the moral
soundness of its people as well .... The laws regarding mar-
riage which provide both when the sexual powers may be
used and the legal and societal context in which children
are born and brought up, as well as laws forbidding adul-
tery, fornication and homosexual practices which express
the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to law-
ful marriage, a pattern [ ] deeply pressed into the sub-
stance of our social life form[s]."51
Here are the two features of marriage which lawmakers from
time out of mind have picked out of that complex open-ended
relationship as critically important to the political common good:
marriage as the principle of sexual morality, and as the only legit-
imate setting in which children should come to be, and be
raised. It has surely been the undoing of marriage that, as a soci-
ety, we have so detached both sex and marriage from children.
VI. GETTING THE ANSWER RIGHT
Contemporary common sense, as well as our legal and moral
traditions, point us to the existence of some decisive relation
among marriage, children and how children come to be.5 2 The
practical insight that marriage has its own intelligible point, and
that it is a one-flesh communion of persons consummated and
actualized in the reproductive-type acts of spouses, cannot be
attained by someone who has no idea of what these terms mean;
nor can it be attained, except with strenuous efforts of imagina-
tion, by people who, due to personal or cultural circumstances,
have little acquaintance with actual marriages thus understood.
For this reason, whatever undermines the sound understanding
and practice of marriage in a culture-including ideologies that
are hostile to that understanding and practice-makes it difficult
for people to grasp the intrinsic value of marriage and marital
intercourse.
Although much in our culture has tended in recent years to
undermine the institution of marriage and the moral under-
standings upon which it rests, longstanding features of our legal
and religious traditions testify to the intrinsic value of marriage
as a two-in-one-flesh communion. Consummation has tradition-
ally (though, perhaps, not universally) been recognized by civil
as well as religious authorities as an essential element of mar-
51. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545-46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52. Much of this part is based upon Robert P. George & Gerard V. Brad-
ley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301 (1985).
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riage. Physical defects and incapacities which render a party
unable to consummate the marriage, existing at the time of the
marriage, and which are incurable are, under most statutes,
grounds for annulment. This requirement for the validity of a
marriage, where in force, has never been treated as satisfied by
an act of sodomy, no matter how pleasurable. Nothing less (or
more) than an act of genital union consummates a marriage; and
such an act consummates even if it is not particularly pleasurable.
Unless otherwise impeded, couples who know they are sterile can
lawfully marry so long as they are capable of consummating their
marriage by performing such an act. By the same token, a mar-
riage cannot be annulled for want of consummation on the
ground that one of the spouses turned out to be sterile. A mar-
riage can, however, be annulled on the ground that impotence
(or some other condition) prevents the partners from consum-
mating it.
The law, in its rules regarding consummation, embodies an
important insight into the nature of marriage as a bodily-no
less than spiritual and emotional-union that is actualized in
reproductive type acts. Some people, however, may well consider
the law simply to be misguided on this point. Marriage, they may
argue, is a one-flesh union only in a metaphorical sense. It is, in
realty, they may say, an emotional union that is served in various
ways by the mutually satisfying orgasmic acts of spouses. Con-
summation, they may contend, ought not to be a requirement
for the validity of marriage, or, if it is to be a requirement, it
should be considered to have been satisfied by a wider range of
possible sexual behaviors.
In the end, one either understands that spousal genital
intercourse has a special significance as instantiating a basic,
non-instrumental value, or something blocks that understanding
and one does not perceive correctly. For the most part, propo-
nents of same-sex marriage honestly do not see any special point
or value in such intercourse. For them, spouses have no reason,
apart from purely subjective preference, ever to choose genital
intercourse over oral and anal intercourse. And because oral
and anal intercourse are available to same-sex couples, such
couples have as much interest in marriage and as much right to
marry as couples of opposite sexes.
By contrast, many other people perceive quite easily the spe-
cial value and significance of the genital intercourse of spouses,
and see that this value and significance obtains even for spouses
who are incapable of having children, or any more children.
They are therefore confident that sodomitical acts cannot be
marital (though they divide over the question whether con-
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tracepted intercourse retains its marital quality). Thus, as a mat-
ter of common sense, they deny that marriage, as a moral reality,
is possible for couples of the same sex.
In my view, children conceived in marital intercourse par-
ticipate in the good of their parents' marriage and are them-
selves noninstrumental aspects of its perfection; thus, spouses
rightly hope for and welcome children, not as "products" they
"make," but rather, as gifts, which if all goes well, supervene on
their acts on marital union. This understanding of children as
gifts to be accepted and valued for their own sake-rather than
as objects that may be willed and brought into being for one's
own purposes-obviously coheres well with certain theistic meta-
physical views, including Jewish and Christian views. It can, how-
ever, also be accommodated by Buddhist and certain other
nontheistic views. Some understanding along these lines of the
moral relationship of parents to the children they may conceive
is essential to the rational affirmation of the dignity of children
as persons: i.e., as ends in themselves, and not mere means of satisfy-
ing desires of their parents; as subjects ofjustice (including funda-
mental and inviolable human rights), rather than objects of will.
Alternative understandings run into sever difficulties in explain-
ing why children may not properly be understood-and rightly
treated-as the property of their parents.
Some people are puzzled by the tendency of moral tradition-
alists to object on moral grounds to the production of human
beings by in vitro fertilization. After all, moral tradition strongly
affirms the goodness of transmitting life to new persons. Why,
then, should couples who are incapable of begetting children in
acts of marital intercourse not resort to in vitro processes in order
to become parents? The short answer is that the manufacturing
of children is inconsistent with respect for their basic equality
and human dignity.
Children are to be desired under a description that does not
reduce the child to the status of a product to be brought into
existence at its parents' will and for their ends. Children rather
are to be treated as persons-possessing full human dignity-
which the spouses are eager to welcome (and take responsibility
for) as a perfective participant in the community established by
their marriage (i.e., their family). (It is in this sense that one
speaks of children as "gifts" that "supervene" on marital acts.)
This is not to suggest that there is anything wrong with spouses
engaging in marital intercourse because they "want" a child. It is
merely to indicate the description under which the "wanting" of
the child is consistent with his or her dignity as a person, and to
highlight the fact that the marital significance of properly moti-
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vated spousal intercourse obtains whether or not conception is
hoped for, results, or is even possible. Importantly, however, the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child is in no way diminished by
any moral defect in the act that brings that child into existence.
VII. HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE COMMON GOOD
Homosexuality is irrelevant to almost every question pertain-
ing to the common good of political society. That is partly
because the most important civil rights are human rights.
Human rights attach to everyone because they are human per-
sons. These rights do not acquire their sense, and vary not at all
in their precise content, according upon one's "sexual orienta-
tion," or, for that matter, on the state of one's character in
regard to other matters, such as justice.
Homosexuality is almost entirely irrelevant partly because
people are to be morally judged on the basis of their conduct not
their condition. Simply being homosexual is not, and should not
be, the basis of criminal liability because being homosexual is not
an act. Similarly, it is wrong to think of "punishing" (a moral
category) anyone for being homosexual, or for any other unjust
attitude or desire.
Finally, homosexuality is almost entirely irrelevant because
most of the particular rights and duties of political and civil life
do not implicate one's sexual activity, habits or orientation-
whatever it is. Eligibility for drivers licenses, for library privileges,
to sit asjurors, duties to pay taxes, observe the speed limit, and to
avoid harms to others have their sources in skills, opportunities
and moral norms which do not include sexual inclination or
activity in any way, for anyone. "Heterosexuals" (as such) are no
more, and no less eligible, for jury service than "homosexuals"
(as such) are.
The law does not condemn homosexuals to loneliness, nor
does it discriminate against same-sex friendship. The law has
always regarded genuine friendship, apart from family ties and
sexual intimacy, as good grounds for some legal relations. Any
two people can sign a lease or take out a loan. Anyone may be
given power of attorney, be appointed guardian ad litem, execu-
tor of an estate. The law presumes that trusted others-
friends-will fill such important legal slots. Friendship therefore
has a vital place in the good life, a place recognized and facili-
tated by our law.
Marriage, it is true, is a type of friendship. The argument of
Part VI is that marriage is a unique type of friendship, specified by
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the capacity to engage in reproductive type acts, which is simply
unavailable to same-sex couples.
CONCLUSION
Have we had that "general consideration" of marriage which
Homer Clark called for in 1988? No. The "transformation" he
describes now is its climactic stage. The conclusive separation of
marriage from its millennia-old identification with reproductive-
type acts-and thus with gender complementarity-is the ques-
tion acutely by same-sex marriage. Yet the argument has not
really been joined. The arguments for revolutionary change
either beg the question, or treat the conclusion as settled by
deduction from established premises. It is true that discordant
elements have been introduced, as Clark testified, into marriage,
but (as he further says) without really thinking about it. Now
that incoherence is said to preclude deliberation. The question
was settled, in other words, without anyone actually asking-
much less answering-it. On a matter so fundamental as this,
that should not be our final answer.
